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Abstract
In this article, we characterize efficient portfolios, i.e. portfolios which are optimal for at least one rational
agent, in a very general financial market model with proportional transaction costs. In our setting, transaction
costs may be random, time-dependent, have jumps and the preferences of the agents are modeled by multivariate
expected utility functions. Thanks to the dual formulation of expected multivariate utility maximization problem
established in Campi and Owen [3], we provide a complete characterization of efficient portfolios, generalizing
earlier results of Dybvig [10] and Jouini and Kallal [16]. We basically show that a portfolio is efficient if and only
if it is cyclically anticomonotonic with respect to at least one consistent price system. Finally, we introduce the
notion of utility price of a given contingent claim as the minimal amount of a given initial portfolio allowing any
agent to reach the claim by trading in the market, and give a dual representation of it.
Keywords: Cyclic anticomonotonicity, utility maximization, proportional transaction costs, duality, util-
ity price.
MSC Classification (2000): 91B16, 91B28.
1 Introduction
In this paper we characterize efficient portfolios in a general multivariate financial market with transaction
costs as in [28, 4, 3], where agents can trade in finitely many risky assets (e.g. foreign currency) facing
transaction costs at each trading. Such transaction costs are proportional, time dependent, random and
they may have jumps.
An efficient portfolio is a portfolio which is optimal for at least one agent, in the sense that it solves
an expected utility maximization problem from terminal wealth of agents with preferences described by
multivariate, concave, strictly increasing (with respect to Rd+-preorder) utility functions. The choice of
multivariate utility functions reflects the idea that the agents will not necessarily liquidate their positions to
a single numeraire at the final date (which is realistic, in particular, on a currency market). This is coherent
with the recent papers [1, 3] dealing with optimal investment problem under frictions. Moreover, it allows
us to rely upon the duality methods developed therein.
A crucial ingredient of our results is the notion of (multivariate) cyclic anticomonotonicity. Cyclic an-
ticomonotonicity is one possible extension to a multidimensional setting of the well-known notion of anti-
comonotonicy between two random variables (see the complete survey by Puccetti and Scarsini [24] and the
references therein). Other multivariate extension with a more variational flavour have been recently studied
and applied to vector risk measure and, more specifically, to optimal risk sharing (see, e.g., [5, 11, 12, 27]).
Roughly speaking, two random variables are anticomonotone when they move in opposite directions.
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Our main result (Theorem 3.2 in this paper) states essentially that a portfolio X0 is efficient if and only
if there exists a consistent price system Z such that X0 and Z are cyclically anticomotonic. This theorem
considerably generalizes previous results in Dybvig [9, 10] and in Jouini and Kallal [17]. Moreover, following
Jouini and Kallal [17], we compute for every contingent claim a measure of inefficiency that does not refer
to any specific utility functions, using the anticomonotonicity property.
The notion of portfolio’s efficiency goes back to a couple of articles by Dybvig [9, 10], where he studies
those strategies that are chosen by at least one rational agent in a simple frictionless complete market with
finitely many and equiprobable states of the world. In this context, the no-arbitrage condition is equivalent
to the existence of a unique linear pricing rule and – this is Dybvig’s result – a consumption bundle is
efficient if and only if it provides at least as much consumption in cheaper states of the world (according
to the unique risk-neutral pricing rule). Relying on this characterization, Dybvig introduces the notion of
distributional price as the minimal price to pay for getting in exchange a contingent claim with a given
distribution. Then he quantifies the inefficiency size of any contingent claims, focusing on some practical
example such as stop-loss strategies.
In a market with frictions (e.g. with transaction costs), things are different. First, the pricing rule is
not linear anymore. Nonetheless, Jouini and Kallal [16] show that the pricing rule is sublinear and can be
viewed as the supremum over a set of linear pricing rules. Furthermore, in [17], they prove that Dybvig’s
characterization of efficient claims still holds under the following form : a portfolio is efficient if and only if it
is anticomonotonic with respect to at least one pricing rule. Moreover, they introduce the notion of “utility
price”, defined as the minimal price to obtain a contingent claim preferred by all rational agents, allowing
them to measure the inefficiency of a given contingent claim.
We continue here the research started in those papers and analyze further the notions of efficiency and
utility price in a frictional model, which is the natural generalization of [16] and has been developed and
studied by several authors. We refers to the recent book by Kabanov and Safarian [21] for an exhaustive
treatment. Because of their generality, the results obtained in this paper are rather abstract. The study of
the efficiency of specific trading strategies in more concrete models (e.g. Black-Scholes model with constant
proportional transaction costs) is interesting on its own and it is postponed to future research.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe the financial model, recalling in particular the
superhedging theorem proved in [4] and some definitions and properties of vector finitely additive measures,
that we will be used in the proofs of our main results. Section 3 contains the main result of the paper on
characterizing efficient trading strategies. Finally, Section 4 is devoted to quantifying the inefficency of a
given portfolio through the notion of utility price.
Notation. Throughout the paper, we will frequently use the following notation:
• On the space Rd, we will set ‖x‖ := maxi |xi| and denote xy or, equivalently, 〈x, y〉 the canonical scalar
product of x and y. Given two vectors x, y we will use the notation x ≥ y (resp. x > y) for x− y ∈ Rd+
(resp. x− y ∈ intRd+).
• For a concave (utility) function U defined on Rd+ , we will denote ∂U the sub-differential of the function
−U , that is:
∂U(x) =
{
y ∈ Rd | U(z) ≤ U(x) + 〈y, z − x〉 ∀z ∈ Rd} .
• For a set A we denote cl(A) its closure and int(A) its interior, with respect to a given topology.
• c.d.f. will stand for cumulative distribution function.
• For a random variable X defined on a probability space (Ω,F ,P) , we denote ess supX and ess inf X
the essential supremum and, respectively, the essential infimum, of the random variable X, i.e.
ess supX := inf{a ∈ R : P(X > a) = 0}, inf ∅ := +∞,
ess inf X := sup{a ∈ R : P(X < a) = 0}, sup ∅ := −∞.
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• We denote (X)− = max(−X, 0) the negative part of the random variable X.
• Given two random vectors X and Y , we will write X ∼ Y when they have the same law and we will
denote by L(X) the set of all random vectors (defined on the same probability space) that have the
same law as X.
2 The financial market
2.1 Assets and trading strategies
Let us recall the basic features of the transaction costs model as formalized in [4] (see also [28]). In such
a model, all agents can trade in d assets according to a random and time varying bid-ask matrix. A d × d
matrix Π = (piij)1≤i,j≤d is called a bid-ask matrix if (i) piij > 0 for every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ d, (ii) piii = 1 for every
1 ≤ i ≤ d, and (iii) piij ≤ piikpikj for every 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ d.
Given a bid-ask matrix Π, the solvency cone K(Π) is defined as the convex polyhedral cone in Rd
generated by the canonical basis vectors ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ d of Rd, and the vectors piijei − ej , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ d. The
convex cone −K(Π) should be intepreted as those portfolios available at price zero. The (positive) polar
cone of K(Π) is defined by
K∗(Π) =
{
w ∈ Rd : 〈v, w〉 ≥ 0,∀v ∈ K(Π)} .
Next, we introduce randomness and time in our model. Let (Ω, (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P) be an atomless† filtered
probability space satisfying the usual conditions and supporting all processes appearing in this paper. An
adapted, ca`dla`g process (Πt)t∈[0,T ] taking values in the set of bid-ask matrices will be called a bid-ask process.
A bid-ask process (Πt)t∈[0,T ] will now be fixed, and we drop it from the notation by writing Kτ (resp. K∗τ )
instead of K(Πτ ) (resp. K
∗(Πτ )) for a stopping time τ .
Moreover, given any two vectors x, y, we will write x t y (resp. x ∗t y) whenever x − y ∈ Kt (resp.
x− y ∈ K∗t ).
In accordance with the framework developed in [4] we make the following technical assumption throughout
the paper. The assumption is equivalent to disallowing a final trade at time T , but it can be relaxed via a
slight modification of the model (see [4, Remark 4.2]). For this reason, we shall not explicitly mention the
assumption anywhere.
Assumption 2.1 FT− = FT and ΠT− = ΠT a.s.
Definition 2.1 An adapted, Rd+ \ {0}-valued, ca`dla`g martingale Z = (Zt)t∈[0,T ] is called a consistent price
process for the bid-ask process (Πt)t∈[0,T ] if Zt ∈ K∗t a.s. for every t ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover, Z will be called a
strictly consistent price process if it satisfies the following additional condition: For every [0, T ]∪{∞}-valued
stopping time τ , Zτ ∈ int(K∗τ ) a.s. on {τ <∞}, and for every predictable [0, T ]∪ {∞}-valued stopping time
σ, Zσ− ∈ int(K∗σ−) a.s. on {σ <∞}. The set of all (strictly) consistent price processes will be denoted by
Z (Zs).
The following assumption, which is used extensively in [4], will also hold throughout the paper.
Assumption 2.2 (SCPS) Existence of a strictly consistent price system: Zs 6= ∅.
This assumption is intimately related to the absence of arbitrage in continuous time financial markets with
proportional transaction costs (see also [16, 13]).
Definition 2.2 Suppose that (Πt)t∈[0,T ] is a bid-ask process such that Assumption 2.2 holds true. An Rd-
valued process V = (Vt)t∈[0,T ] is called a self-financing portfolio process for the bid-ask process (Πt)t∈[0,T ] if
it satisfies the following properties:
†I.e., such a space supports a uniform random variable U on (0, 1).
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(i) It is predictable and a.e. path has finite variation (not necessarily right-continuous).
(ii) For every pair of stopping times 0 ≤ σ ≤ τ ≤ T , we have
Vτ − Vσ ∈ −conv
 ⋃
σ≤t<τ
Kt, 0
 a.s.
A self-financing portfolio process V is called admissible if it satisfies the additional property
(i) There is a constant a > 0 such that VT + a1 ∈ KT a.s. and 〈Vτ + a1, Zsτ 〉 ≥ 0 a.s. for all [0, T ]-valued
stopping times τ and for every strictly consistent price process Zs ∈ Zs. Here, 1 ∈ Rd denotes the
vector whose entries are all equal to 1.
Let Ax denote the set of all admissible, self-financing portfolio processes with initial endowment x ∈ Rd, and
let
AxT := {VT : V ∈ Ax}
be the set of all contingent claims attainable at time T with initial endowment x. Note that AxT = x+A0T
for all x ∈ Rd. Moreover, we denote A := ∪x∈RdAx the set of all admissible strategies.
In such a market with transactions costs, the value of a portfolio V is not equivalent to its liquidation
value at the final date 〈VT , ST 〉, where S is some price process measured in terms of some given nume´raire,
and it is restrictive to assume that utility functions are only functions of the liquidation value. It is more
relevant to consider each agent endowed with a utility function U ∈ U , where U is the set of functions
U : Rd → [−∞,∞) supported on the non-negative orthant Rd+, i.e. the closure of its effective domain
domU := {x ∈ Rd : U(x) > −∞} is Rd+, and satisfying the following conditions :
• U is upper semi-continuous
• intRd+ ⊂ domU .
• U is strictly Rd+-increasing, i.e. U(x1) > U(x2) whenever x1 > x2, i.e. x1 − x2 ∈ intRd+.
• U is concave on the interior of the positive orthant, i.e. intRd+ = (0,∞)d.
The case of an agent willing to liquidate his portfolio into a given subset of the risky assets could be
included in the picture (see Remark 3.2 for more details).
Example 2.1 Examples of utility functions belonging to the class U are U(x) = ∑di=1 Ui(xi) with Ui
one-dimensional HARA utility function, and U(x) =
∏d
i=1 x
γi
i with γi > 0 and
∑
i γi < 1.
Each agent chooses an optimal strategy, depending on his preferences (i.e. on the utility function U) and
on his initial portfolio x. This optimal strategy is chosen in order to maximize the expected utility of the
terminal holdings vector.
Definition 2.3 An admissible strategy V ∈ A, with an initial portfolio x ∈ Rd, is said to be efficient if and
only if there exists a utility function U ∈ U such that VT ∈ AxT is solution of:
u(x) = sup
X∈AxT
E [U(X)] . (2.1)
We say that a contingent claim X is efficient if it is the terminal value of an efficient strategies V , i.e.
X = VT for some efficient strategy V .
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For the convenience of the reader we present now a reformulation of [4, Theorem 4.1], giving a dual
characterization of super-replicable contingent claims. We will use it to derive a dual formula for the amount
of a given portfolio x necessary to hedge a contingent claim X.
For some positive contingent claim X ∈ L0(Rd+,FT ), let:
Γ(X) :=
{
x ∈ Rd | VT T X for some V ∈ Ax
}
. (2.2)
The set Γ(X) is the set of initial portfolios allowing to construct a strategy which hedges the contingent
claim X. Before stating the super-hedging theorem we need to define one more set
D := {m ∈ ba(Rd) : m(X) ≤ 0 ∀X ∈ C},
where C := A0T ∩ L∞(Rd). With these definitions we can state the following result :
Theorem 2.1 (Super-replication) Let x ∈ Rd and let X be an FT -measurable, Rd+-valued random vari-
able. Under Assumption 2.2, the following are equivalent :
(i) X ∈ AxT ;
(ii) E [〈X,ZT 〉] ≤ 〈x, Z0〉, for all Z ∈ Zs;
(iii) mc(X) ≤ 〈x,mc(Ω)〉 for all m ∈ D.
Proof. The equivalence between (i) and (ii) is a straightforward consequence of [4, Theorem 4.1].
Moreover, since to each Zs ∈ Zs we can associate a countably additive measure m ∈ ba(Rd+) as follows
dm
dP := Z
s
T , we clearly have that (iii) implies (ii). To complete the proof it suffices to show that (i) implies
(iii). Consider the contingent claim X and decompose it as X = X˜ + x where X˜ ∈ A0T . Since X˜ is not
necessarily in L∞(Rd), we need to consider the sequence X˜n := X˜ ∧ (1n), where the maximum is taken
componentwise, i.e. with respect to the preorder induced by Rd+. The sequence clearly belongs to C and
converges a.s. towards X˜. For any n ≥ 1 and m ∈ D, by definition of the set D we have mc(X˜n) ≤ 0 so that
passing to the limit yields
mc(X) = mc(X˜) + 〈x,mc(Ω)〉 ≤ 〈x,mc(Ω)〉.
The proof is now complete. 
2.2 Euclidean vector measures
A function m from a field F of subsets of a set Ω to a Banach space X is called a finitely additive vector
measure, or simply a vector measure if m(A1 ∪ A2) = m(A1) + m(A2), whenever A1 and A2 are disjoint
members of F . In this paper, we will be concerned with the special case where X = Rd; we refer to the
associated vector measure as a “Euclidean vector measure”, or simply a “Euclidean measure”.
Let us recall a few definitions from the classical, one-dimensional setting. The total variation of a (finitely
additive) measure m : F → R is the function |m| : F → [0,∞] defined by
|m|(A) := sup
n∑
j=1
|m(Aj)|,
where the supremum is taken over all finite sequences (Aj)
n
j=1 of disjoint sets in F with Aj ⊆ A. A
measure m is said to have bounded total variation if |m|(Ω) < ∞. A measure m is said to be bounded if
sup {|m(A)| : A ∈ F} <∞. It is straightforward to show that
sup {|m(A)| : A ∈ F} ≤ |m|(Ω) ≤ 2 sup {|m(A)| : A ∈ F} ,
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hence a measure is bounded if and only if it has bounded total variation. A measure m is said to be purely
finitely additive if 0 ≤ µ ≤ |m| and µ is countably additive imply that µ = 0. A measure m is said to be
(weakly) absolutely continuous with respect to P if m(A) = 0 whenever A ∈ F and P(A) = 0.
We turn now to the d-dimensional case. A Euclidean measure m can be decomposed into its one-
dimensional coordinate measures mi : F → R by defining mi(A) :=
〈
ei,m(A)
〉
, where ei is the i-th canonical
basis vector of Rd. In this way, m(A) = (m1(A), . . . ,md(A)) for every A ∈ F . We shall say that a Euclidean
measure m is bounded, purely finitely additive or (weakly) absolutely continuous with respect to P if each of
its coordinate measures is bounded, purely finitely additive or (weakly) absolutely continuous with respect
to P.
Let ba(Rd) = ba(Ω,FT ,P;Rd) denote the vector space of bounded Euclidean measures m : FT → Rd,
which are (weakly) absolutely continuous with respect to P. Let ca(Rd) the subspace of countably additive
members of ba(RD). Equipped with the norm
‖m‖ba(Rd) :=
d∑
i=1
|mi|(Ω),
the spaces ba(Rd) and ca(Rd) are Banach spaces.
Let ba(Rd+) denote the convex cone of Rd+-valued measures within ba(Rd). We recall the following
fundamental Yosida-Hewitt decomposition : Given any m ∈ ba(Rd) there exists a unique decomposition
m = mc +mp where mc ∈ ca(Rd) and mp is purely finitely additive. If m ∈ ba(Rd+) then mc,mp ∈ ba(Rd+).
We shall see now that elements of ba(Rd) play a natural role as linear functionals on spaces of (essentially)
bounded Rd-valued random variables. First, some more notation: Let L0(Rd) = L0(Ω,FT ,P;Rd) denote
the space of Rd-valued random variables (identified under the equivalence relation of a.s. equality). Given
X ∈ L0(Rd) we define the coordinate random variables Xi ∈ L0(R) for i = 1, . . . , D by Xi := 〈X, ei〉, so
that X = (X1, . . . , Xd). Let L1(Rd) denote the subspace of L0(Rd) consisting of those random variables X
for which ‖X‖1 := E
[∑
i |Xi|
]
<∞. Let L∞(Rd) denote the subspace of L0(Rd) consisting of those random
variables X for which ‖X‖∞ := ess sup
{
maxi |Xi|
}
< ∞. Finally, let L∞(Rd)∗ denote the dual space of
(L∞(Rd), ‖.‖∞).
We now define the map Ψ : ba(Rd)→ L∞(Rd)∗ by
(
Ψ(m)
)
(X) :=
∫
Ω
〈X,dm〉 :=
d∑
i=1
∫
Ω
Xidmi, (2.3)
where (m1, . . . ,md) is the coordinate-wise representation of m. We also define the map Φ : ca(Rd)→ L1(Rd)
by Φ(m) :=
(
dm1
dP , . . . ,
dmd
dP
)
, where dmidP is the Radon-Nikody´m derivative of the i-th coordinate measure.
Finally, we define the isometric embedding i : L1(Rd) → L∞(Rd)∗ by (i(Y ))(X) := E [〈X,Y 〉]. We recall
the following two facts, whose proofs can be found in [3]:
• The maps Ψ and Φ are isometric isomorphisms. Furthermore, i ◦ Φ = Ψ|ca(Rd).
• (ba(Rd), ‖.‖ba(Rd)) has a σ(ba(Rd), L∞(Rd))-compact unit ball (Alaoglu’s theorem).
For the remainder of the paper, we shall overload our notation as follows: Given m ∈ ba(Rd) and X ∈
L∞(Rd), we write m(X) as an abbreviation of
(
Ψ(m)
)
(X), and we define dmdP :=
(
dm1
dP , . . . ,
dmd
dP
)
= Φ(m).
Given x ∈ Rd and A ∈ FT it follows from equation (2.3) that m(xχA) = 〈x,m(A)〉, where χA denotes
the indicator random variable of A. In the special case where A = Ω, we have m(x) = 〈x,m(Ω)〉.
Let L0(Rd+) and L∞(Rd+) denote respectively the convex cones of random variables in L0(Rd) and L∞(Rd)
which are Rd+-valued a.s. Note that if m ∈ ba(Rd+) and X ∈ L∞(Rd+) then m(X) ≥ 0 (see [25, Theorem
4.4.13]). This observation allows us to extend the definition of m(X) to cover the case where m ∈ ba(Rd+)
and X ∈ L0(Rd+) by setting
m(X) := lim
n↑∞
m (X ∧ (n1)) , (2.4)
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where 1 ∈ Rd denotes the vector whose entries are all equal to 1, and (x1, . . . , xd) ∧ (y1, . . . , yd) := (x1 ∧
y1, . . . , xd ∧ yd). It is trivial that (2.4) is consistent with the definition of m(X) for X ∈ L∞(Rd). It follows
that given m1,m2 ∈ ba(Rd+), λ1, λ2, µ1, µ2 ≥ 0 and X1, X2 ∈ L0(Rd+), we have
(λ1m1 + λ2m2)(µ1X1 + µ2X2) = λ1µ1m1(X1) + λ1µ2m1(X2) + λ2µ1m2(X1) + λ2µ2m2(X2).
Note that the property i ◦ Φ = Ψ|ca(Rd) means that given m ∈ ca(Rd) and X ∈ L∞(Rd) we have
m(X) = E
[〈
X, dmdP
〉]
. It is easy to show that this property is also true under the extended definition (2.4).
For more details on such measures and their application to multivariate utility maximization, we refer to the
paper [3] and the references therein.
3 Characterization of efficient trading strategies
As in Jouini and Kallal [17], the basic idea is to characterize efficient strategies using a dual characterization
of expected utility maximization problems. In a continuous time setting, duality is more complex to handle.
Such optimization problems have been studied in a very general frictionless market model by Kramkov
and Schachermayer [21]. In a multidimensional case, the problem was studied first by Deelstra and al. [6].
However, these articles focus on some suitable hypothesis on the utility function, as the one on the asymptotic
elasticity, in order to have a solution for the primal problem. In our setting, we are not interested in minimal
conditions guaranteeing existence since existence of optimal portfolios is part of the definition of efficient
portfolios. Thus we do not need to impose regularity conditions on the utility functions. That’s why we
will use instead recent results established in Campi and Owen [3], which seem to be more suitable for our
purposes.
In the following subsection, we introduce the notion of cyclic anticomonotonicity, which turns out to be
relevant in our setting. Then, we present our principal result, which characterizes efficient contingent claims
via cyclic anticomonotonicity.
3.1 Cyclic anticomonotonicity
In one-dimensional setting, two random variables X,Y are anticomonotonic if they vary in opposite direc-
tions. The precise definition goes as follows.
Definition 3.1 Two univariate random variables X and Y defined on the same probability space (Ω,F ,P)
are anticomonotonic if there exists A ∈ F , with P(A) = 1, such that:
(X(ω)−X(ω′)) (Y (ω)− Y (ω′)) ≤ 0 for every (ω, ω′) ∈ A×A. (3.1)
In the multidimensional case, there exists several extension depending on which properties of the one-
dimensional notion one wants to keep (see the survey [24]). In our case, it turns out that the “good” extension
is the so-called cyclic anticomotonicity.
Definition 3.2 Two d-dimensional random vectors X and Y defined on the same probability space (Ω,F ,P)
are said to be cyclically anticomonotonic if and only there exists A ∈ F with P(A) = 1 such that for every
p ≥ 2 and (ω1, ω2, ..., ωp) ∈ Ap, we have:
p∑
i=1
〈X(ωi), Y (ωi)− Y (ωi+1)〉 ≤ 0. (3.2)
where we set ωp+1 = ω1.
Rockafellar([26], Theorem 24.9) shows that the multivalued maps belonging to the subdifferential of some
concave function are characterized by the cyclic anticomonotonicity. This is the property that makes cyclic
7
anticomonotonicity the good multivariate extension in our setting. It will be clear from the proof of Theorem
3.2.
The concept of anticomonotonicity and cyclic anticomonotonicity are in fact equivalent in the one dimen-
sional setting, i.e. for random variables. However, this is not the case in the multidimensional framework
(see Rockafellar [26], Section 24, in particular the discussion following the proof of Theorem 24.9, and the
survey by Puccetti and Scarsini [24], where this notion of multivariate (anti)comonotonicity is called c-
monotonicity).
Note that one could have defined cyclic anticomonotonicity using the notion of product probability spaces.
These two concepts are in fact equivalent. This is the content of next proposition, whose proof is provided
in the Appendix.
Proposition 3.1 Let X,Y be two random vectors on the space (Ω,F ,P). For each p ∈ N∗, define P⊗p as
the usual product probability on the product space (Ω⊗p,F⊗p). The cyclic anticomonotonicity between X and
Y is equivalent to:
P⊗p
[
p∑
i=1
〈X(ωi), Y (ωi)− Y (ωi+1)〉 ≤ 0
]
= 1 (3.3)
for every (ω1, . . . , ωp) ∈ Ωp and for all p ≥ 2, where we set ωp+1 = ω1.
An important corollary of this proposition gives us a useful criterion to check whether two random vectors
X,Y are cyclically anticomonotonic:
Corollary 3.1 Let d ∈ N∗ and let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space. Suppose X and Y are two d-dimensional
random vectors such that there aren’t any positive number ε > 0 and any finitely many sets Ωi ∈ F with
P(Ωi) > 0, i = 1, . . . , p, such that
p∑
i=1
〈Y (ωi), X(ωi)−X(ωi+1)〉 ≥ ε, ∀(ω1, ..., ωp) ∈ Ω1 × ...× Ωp, (3.4)
where we set ωp+1 = ω1. Then X and Y are cyclically anticomonotonic.
In the one dimensional case, for two fixed distributions FX and FY on discrete probability spaces with
equiprobable states or on atomless probability spaces, we can find random variables X distributed as FX and
Y distributed as FY such that X and Y are anticomonotonic (see Hardy and al. [15]). The next result proves
that this result is extendable to the multidimensional case with the notion of cyclic anticomonotoncity. Its
proof is provided in the Appendix. Recall that L(X) denotes the set of all random vectors (defined on the
same probability space as X) that have the same law as X.
Proposition 3.2 Let X0, Y ∈ L0(Rd+). Assume that the c.d.f. of X0 is continuous. There exists a random
vector X˜0 ∈ L(X0), such that X˜0 and Y are cyclically anticomonotonic. Furthermore, X˜0 satisfies
E[X˜0Y ] = min {E [XY ] : X ∈ L(X0)} . (3.5)
3.2 Characterization of efficient strategies
We turn now to the problem of characterizing efficient portfolios, i.e. admissible portfolios solving
u(x) = sup
X∈Ax
E [U(XT )] (3.6)
for some utility function U ∈ U and some initial portfolio x ∈ Rd.
We will make use of the duality result that has been established in Campi and Owen [3]. To do that, we
recall once more that D denotes the dual cone of C = A0T ∩ L∞(Rd), i.e.
D := (−C)∗ = {m ∈ ba(Rd) : m(X) ≤ 0 for all X ∈ C}.
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Note that since −L∞(Rd+) ⊆ C, we have D ⊆ ba(Rd+). Moreover, we denote U∗ the conjugate function of U ,
i.e.
U∗(y) := sup
x∈Rd
{U(x)− 〈x, y〉}, y ∈ Rd.
For reader’s convenience, we collect in the next proposition the results in [3] that we are going to use
in the proofs. The next proposition states in particular that there is no duality gap between primal and a
(suitably defined) dual problem provided the initial portfolio x does not lie on the boundary of dom(u), and
that the dual problem has a solution whenever x lies in the interior of dom(u).
Proposition 3.1 (Duality) Let U be a multivariate utility function in U . The following hold:
(i) u is a utility function (recall the definition above) such that
cl(dom(u)) = −{x ∈ Rd : x ∈ A0T }
(ii) If x ∈ int(dom(u)) then
u(x) = min
m∈D
{
E
[
U∗
(
dmc
dP
)]
+m(x)
}
∈ R. (3.7)
Proof. It is a combination of Proposition 3.1, Lemma 3.3 and Proposition 3.5 in [3]. 
Using this result, we can provide a characterization of efficient strategies based on the notion of cyclic
anticomonotonicity introduced before. This is one of our main results and it is the content of the next
theorem. Let I := int(−A0T ∩ Rd). We know that for any initial portfolio in I the corresponding expected
utility maximization problem is well-defined. Since U = −∞ outside Rd+, we will consider without loss of
generality only positive contingent claims X0 ∈ L0(Rd+).
Theorem 3.2 (Efficient contingent claims). Let x0 ∈ I. A Rd+-valued contingent claim X0 is efficient
for the initial portfolio x0 if and only if there exists a finitely additive measure m0 = m
c
0 + m
p
0 ∈ D, such
that:
(i) Y0 :=
dmc0
dP ∈ intRd+ a.s. ;
(ii) mc0(X0) = E[X0Y0] = m0(x0);
(iii) the random vectors X0 and Y0 =
dmc0
dP are cyclically anticomonotonic;
(iv) the following properties hold :
ess sup ‖Y0‖ =∞ ⇒ ess inf ‖X0‖ = 0, (3.8)
ess sup ‖X0‖ <∞ ⇒ ess inf ‖Y0‖ > 0. (3.9)
Proof. Efficiency ⇒ properties (i)-(iv). Let X0 be an Rd+-valued efficient contingent claim for
a utility function U ∈ U and an initial portfolio x0. Since x0 ∈ int(dom(u)), u being the value function
corresponding to U , there exists a vector-valued finitely additive measure m0 = m
c
0 +m
p
0 ∈ D such that
u(x0) = E[U(X0)] = E
[
U∗
(
dmc0
dP
)]
+m0(x0), (3.10)
where the second equality is due to (3.7). On the other hand we also have
u(x0) = E
[
U(X0)−
〈
X0,
dmc0
dP
〉
+
〈
X0,
dmc0
dP
〉]
≤ E
[
U∗
(
dmc0
dP
)]
+ E
[〈
X0,
dmc0
dP
〉]
≤ E
[
U∗
(
dmc0
dP
)]
+m0(x0).
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Because of (3.10), all those inequalities are in fact equalities, so that in particular we have mc0(X0) = m0(x0),
which is property (ii).
Property (i) is in Proposition 3.9 in Campi and Owen [3].
We now prove property (iii), i.e. that
dmc0
dP and X0 are cyclically anticomonotonic. First, set Y0 :=
dmc0
dP
and notice that by the definition of the dual function U∗ we have
U(X)−XY0 − U∗(Y0) ≤ 0
for all Rd+-valued contingent claim X, and that by optimality E[U(X0)−X0Y0 −U∗(Y0)] = 0. That implies
U(X0) − X0Y0 − U∗(Y0) = 0 a.s., which is equivalent to Y0 belonging a.s. to the subdifferential ∂U(X0)
(Theorem 23.5(d) in Rockafellar [26]), which is in turn equivalent to cyclic anticomonotonicity (Theorem
24.8 in Rockafellar [26] as well as Theorem 4.7 in [24]).
We conclude this part of the proof showing the two properties in (iv). We prove first property (3.8).
Suppose first there exist integers i, j ∈ {1, ..., d} such that ess supY i0 = +∞ and ess inf Xj0 > 0, and let’s
work toward a contradiction. There exists a real number ε > 0, such that ε1 ∈ domU and Xj0 > 2ε, a.s.,
which implies that ‖X0‖1 ≥ Xj01 ≥ 2ε1, where ‖x‖ := maxi |xi|. Since Y0 ∈ ∂U(X0) ⊂ ∂U(‖X0‖1) a.s., we
have:
U(ε1)− U(‖X0‖1) ≤ U(ε1)− U(X0) ≤ 〈Y0, ε−X0〉 ≤ 〈Y0, ε− 2ε〉 = −〈Y0, ε〉. (3.11)
Since ess supY i0 = +∞, we can choose (using a diagonal procedure) an Rd+-increasing sequence (Y0(ωn))n≥1
such that limn→+∞−〈Y0(ωn), ε〉 = −∞. Moreover, by monotonicity of the function U , we have U(‖X0‖1) ≥
U(X0) > −∞ a.s. (since X0 is efficient, thus a maximizer). By letting n tend to +∞, the RHS in (3.11)
tends to −∞, while its LHS is finite (since ε lies in the domain of U), which is a contradiction.
Now, we prove property (3.9), i.e. ess sup ‖X0‖ < ∞ ⇒ ess inf ‖Y0‖ > 0. Indeed if ess sup ‖X0‖ < ∞
one can choose two points x′, x′′ with x′ − x′′ ∈ intRd+ and x′′ ≥ X0 almost surely. Since Y0 ∈ ∂U(X0), we
deduce that
U(x′)− U(x′′) ≤ U(x′)− U(X0) ≤ 〈Y0, x′ −X0〉 ≤ 〈Y0, x′〉.
Assume, by contradiction, that ess inf ‖Y0‖ > 0, so that we can find a sequence (Y0(ωn))n≥1 converging
compentwise to 0. Thus, 〈Y0(ωn), x′〉 converges to 0 as well, yielding that U(x′) = U(x′′), which contradicts
the strict monotonicity of the utility function U .
Properties (i)-(iv) ⇒ efficiency. Let X0 and m0 = mc0 +mp0 satisfy properties (i)-(iv) of this theorem
with Y0 :=
dmc0
dP . Let A be one of the measurable sets with probability one given in the definition of cyclic
anticomonotonicity. We fix an ω0 ∈ A and, motivated by the proof of Theorem 24.8 in [26], we consider the
function U on Rd+ by:
U(x) := inf {〈x−X0(ωp), Y0(ωp)〉+ · · ·+ 〈X0(ω1)−X0(ω0), Y0(ω0)〉} , x ∈ Rd+
where the infimum is taken over all finite sets (ω0, ω1, . . . , ωp) (p arbitrary) of elements of A. Moreover, we
set U(x) = −∞ for x /∈ Rd+, so that we have in particular that dom(U) ⊂ Rd+.
We will prove that U belongs to U and that X0 is efficient for U along the following steps. First, we prove
in (1) that U is a proper closed concave function. Then for each ω ∈ A, we note that Y0(ω) ∈ ∂U (X0(ω)),
which corresponds to property (2) below, and deduce in (3) that U is nondecreasing with respect to .
Finally, establishing in (4) that cl(dom(U)) = Rd+ and in (5) that U is strictly increasing, we deduce in (6)
that U belongs to U and X0 is efficient for U .
(1) Since U is an infimum of a collection of affine functions, U is a closed concave function. Moreover,
by construction we have U(X0(ω0)) = 0 by cyclic anticomonotonicity of X0 and Y0 and hence U is proper.
(2) Let ω ∈ A, it is enough to show that for any α > U (X0(ω)), and any z ∈ Rd, the following property
holds:
U(z) < α+ 〈Y0(ω), z −X0(ω)〉.
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By definition of U , there exists some ωi, i = 1, . . . , p such that:
α > 〈Y0(ωp), X0(ω)−X0(ωp)〉+ · · ·+ 〈Y0(ω0), X0(ω1)−X0(ω0)〉.
By definition of U and setting ωp+1 = ω, we deduce:
U(z) ≤ 〈Y0(ωp), z −X0(ωp+1)〉+ · · ·+ 〈Y0(ω0), X0(ω1)−X0(ω0)〉 < α+ 〈Y0(ωp), z −X0(ω)〉
and this proves that Y0(ω) ∈ ∂U(X0(ω)).
(3) We prove that U(x′) ≥ U(x) as soon as x′ ≥ x, i.e. x′− x ∈ Rd+. Indeed, using U ’s definition, we can
choose ε > 0 and (ω0, ω1, . . . , ωp) such that
〈x′ −X0(ωp), Y0(ωp)〉+ · · ·+ 〈X0(ω1)−X0(ω0), Y0(ω0)〉 ≤ U(x′) + ε.
Using the definition of U once more, we have
U(x) ≤ 〈x−X0(ωp), Y0(ωp)〉+ · · ·+ 〈X0(ω1)−X0(ω0), Y (ω0)〉
≤ U(x′) + ε+ 〈x− x′, Y0(ωp)〉
and since x′ − x ∈ Rd+ and Y (ωp) ∈ intRd+, we have U(x) ≤ U(x′) + ε. Being ε > 0 arbitrary, we can
conclude that U is increasing for the preorder induced by Rd+.
(4) First, notice that U is finite on each X0(ω) for ω ∈ A.‡ Consider first the case where ess inf ‖X0‖ = 0
and take some x ∈ intRd+. We can choose a ω ∈ A such that X0(ω) ≤ x, and deduce that U (X0(ω)) ≤ U(x),
i.e. x ∈ dom(U) so implying that intRd+ ⊂ domU . Since domU ⊂ Rd+ (by definition of U), we have that
cl(domU)) = Rd+. If, on the contrary, one has ess inf ‖X0‖ > 0, then, by property (iv) in the statement we
have ess sup ‖Y0‖ <∞. Assume that for some x ∈ intRd+, U(x) = −∞, and choose a sequence xn ∈ domU
such that un := U(xn) goes to −∞ as n→ +∞. Proceeding as in (2) above, for all n ≥ 1 there exists some
finite sequence (ωi)
p
i=1 (depending on the chosen n) such that
un > 〈Y0(ωp), zn −X0(ωp)〉+ · · ·+ 〈Y0(ω0), X0(ω1)−X0(ω0)〉.
By definition of U ad setting ωp+1 = ω0, we have
U(X0(ω0)) ≤ 〈Y0(ωp), X0(ω0)−X0(ωp+1)〉+ · · ·+ 〈Y0(ω0), X0(ω1)−X0(ω0)〉
≤ un + 〈Y0(ωp), X0(ω0)− zn〉
≤ un +M‖X0(ω0)− zn‖,
where M ≥ ess sup ‖Y0‖. This leads to a contradiction since the RHS above goes to −∞ as n→ +∞ while
the LHS stays finite.
(5) Let’s take x and x′ such that x′ > x, i.e. x′ − x ∈ intRd+. First, suppose that X0 ≤ x′ almost surely.
In particular ess sup ‖X0‖ < ∞, and from property (iv) we have ess inf |Y j0 | > 0 for some j. As in (3), we
can choose ε > 0 and ω ∈ A such that :
U(x) ≤ U(x′) + ε+ 〈x− x′, Y (ω)〉.
Therefore, 〈x′ − x, Y0(ω)〉 ≥ (x′j − xj)ess inf Y j0 > 0 a.s. so that U(x) < U(x′). Now, suppose that there
exists ω ∈ A such that X0(ω)  x′. We can nonetheless choose x′ ≥ x′′ ≥ x with x′′ = 〈α,X0(ω)− x′〉 for a
suitable α ∈ Rd. Thus, we have
U(x′′) ≥ U(x) + 〈Y0(ω), x′′ − x〉.
But Y0(ω) ∈ intRd+ (property (i) of this theorem) and consequently 〈Y0(ω0), x′′ − x〉 > 0. We can conclude
that U(x′) ≥ U(x′′) > U(x).
‡Since Y0(ω) ∈ ∂U(X0(ω)) for all ω ∈ A, we have ∂U(X0(ω)) 6= ∅. Thus, the fact that dom(∂U) ⊂ dom(U) implies that
X0(ω) ∈ dom(∂U) ⊂ dom(U), so that U(X0(ω)) > −∞.
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(6) Let X ∈ Ax0T . Since, Y0 ∈ ∂U(X0) almost surely, we have:
E [U(X)]− E [U(X0)] ≤ E [Y0(X −X0)] ≤ 0.
Therefore X0 is efficient for U and x0. 
Remark 3.1 A careful inspection of the proof of the previous theorem reveals that the assumption of upper
semicontinuity in the definition of U can be replaced by the minimal requirement of measurability.
Remark 3.2 In many papers on utility maximization under transaction costs (see, e.g., [2, 6, 19]), the agent
liquidates his terminal portfolio to the first asset. As in the two papers [1, 3], one could include the slightly
more general case of agents willing to liquidate their final portfolios to the first k assets with k ≤ d. It suffices
to consider utility functions of the form U(x1, . . . , xd) = Uk(x1, . . . , xk). In this case, the characterization
can be proved performing the same arguments with respect to the first k coordinates and using the facts that,
in this case, an optimal portfolio X0 is zero everywhere but in the first k component (which has been proved
in [3]). Of course, the property of cyclic anticomonotonicity would hold between the first k coordinates of
X0 and the first k coordinates of at least one Y = dm
c/dP with m = mc +mp ∈ D.
4 Utility price and inefficiency size
In this section, we study the quality of an admissible strategy starting from an initial portfolio x0 ∈ I and
leading to a final positive not necessarily efficient gain X0 ∈ Ax0T , whatever the preferences of the agent are.
We would like to quantify the possible inefficiency of that strategy.
Using the duality result in Theorem 2.1 (super-replication theorem), we can evaluate as a first step the
amount of portfolio x0 needed to hedge the contingent claim X0. To do that, consider a contingent claim
X0 and an initial nonzero portfolio x0 ∈ Rd \ {0}. We denote pi(X0, x0) the amount of portfolio x0 allowing
an agent to (super-)hedge X0. The next lemma contains a dual characterization of it. Before that, we need
to give one more definition. Let D⊥(x0) denote the subset of D given by
D⊥(x0) := {m ∈ D : mc(Ω) ∈ K∗0 (x0)}, (4.1)
where
K∗0 (x0) :=
{
z ∈ K∗0 : z =
x0
‖x0‖2 + z
⊥, 〈z⊥, x0〉 = 0
}
(4.2)
when x0 is nonzero, otherwise K
∗
0 (0) := K
∗
0 . Notice that K
∗
0 (x0) is a closed convex non empty set and that
whenever x0 ∈ Rd+ we have K∗0 = cone(K∗0 (x0)).
Lemma 1 The smallest amount of portfolio x0 needed to hedge the contingent claim X0 is given by
pi(X0, x0) = sup
m∈D⊥(x0)
mc(X0). (4.3)
As a consequence, X0 ∈ Ax0T if and only if
sup
m∈D⊥(x0)
mc(X0) ≤ 1. (4.4)
Proof. Let λ > 0 be a certain amount of portfolio x0. Using Theorem (2.1), we have that X0 can be
hedged by the initial holdings vector λx0, if and only if:
mc(X0) ≤ λ〈x0,mc(Ω)〉 for every m ∈ D. (4.5)
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We claim that the latter condition is equivalent to the following
mc(X0) ≤ λ〈x0,mc(Ω)〉 for every m ∈ D⊥(x0). (4.6)
Clearly (4.5) implies (4.6). Assume (4.6) and let m be any measure in D. Since mc(Ω) ∈ K∗0 and K∗0 =
cone(K∗0 (x0)), we have m
c(Ω) = βz0 where β ≥ 0 and z0 ∈ K∗0 (x0). If β = 0 there is nothing to prove.
Consider the case β > 0 and define the measure mβ := m/β ∈ D. Moreover, mβ ∈ D⊥(x0) by construction.
The claim is proved. To conclude the proof, notice that whenever m ∈ D⊥(x0) one has mc(Ω) = x0/‖x0‖2 +
z⊥ with 〈z⊥, x0〉 = 0, so that 〈x0,mc(Ω)〉 = 1. Thus, X0 can be hedged by the initial portfolio λx0 if and
only if
sup
m∈D⊥(x0)
mc(X0) ≤ λ
which ends the proof. 
Remark 4.1 Using property (ii) of Theorem 2.1 instead of (iii), we can obtain the following representation
as well
pi(X0, x0) = sup
Z∈Z⊥(x0)
E [ZTX0] ,
where Z⊥(x0) = {Z ∈ Z : Z0x0 ∈ K∗0 (x0)}.
We want to define a “universal” measure of portfolios’ efficiency, in the sense that it does not depend on
the preferences of the agents. We propose the following one, which generalizes the notion of “utility price”
considered in, e.g., Jouini and Kallal [17]. Let us first introduce the set BU (X0) of all contingent claims which
are better than X0 for an agent with the utility function U (the notation B clearly standing for ‘better’), i.e.
BU (X0) =
{
X ∈ L0(Rd+) : E [U(X)] ≥ E [U(X0)]
}
. (4.7)
Notice that if X ′ ∼ X0 then BU (X ′) = BU (X0) for all utility functions U ∈ U .
Definition 4.1 Let X0 ∈ Ax0T be an attainable contingent claim with x0 ∈ I. The utility price of X0 with
respect to the initial portfolio x0, denoted P
U (X0, x0), is defined as the minimum percentage of x0 needed
for any agent to fund an admissible strategy in A giving at least the same expected utility as X0, i.e.
PU (X0, x0) := sup
U∈U
inf
X∈BU (X0)
pi(X,x0). (4.8)
The inefficiency size is defined as IU (X0, x0) := 1− PU (X0, x0) ∈ [0, 1].
Remark 4.2 Notice that if X0 is efficient for an initial portfolio x0 and some utility function U ∈ U , we
have pi(X0, x0) = 1 for all X ∈ BU (X0), implying that PU (X0, x0) = 1. Indeed, assume that pi(X0, x0) < 1
for some X ∈ BU (X0). Since X0 is efficient for some x0 and U ∈ U , we have that X0 is a maximizer for
an agent having utility function U and an initial portfolio x0. Moreover, by definition of pi(X0, x0), the
initial portfolio pi(X0, x0)x0 < x0 leads to X as well. In other terms, the initial wealth x0 may lead to the
terminal portfolio X0 + (1− pi(X0, x0))x0 > X. Since U is strictly increasing, this contradicts the fact that
X0 is a maximizer. Thus, when X0 is efficient its utility price P
U (X0, x0) = 1. This justifies the use of
IU (X0, x0) = 1− PU (X0, x0) as a measure of the possible inefficiency of a given terminal portfolio X0.
It is natural in this framework to introduce the following set
B(X0) :=
⋂
U∈U
BU (X0) =
{
X ∈ L0(Rd+) : E [U(X)] ≥ E [U(X0)] ,∀U ∈ U
}
, (4.9)
to describe the set of all (positive) contingent claims which are better than X0 for all those agents whose
preferences belong to U .
We can now state the main result of this section, giving in particular in (ii) a dual representation of the
utility price. For a subset A of L0(Rd+), we denote by conv(A) the closure (for the a.s. convergence) of the
convex hull generated by A.
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Theorem 4.1 Let x0 ∈ I be an initial portfolio and let X0 be a contingent claim in Ax0T . Moreover, assume
that the c.d.f. of X0 is continuous. Thus, the utility price of X0 satisfies the following properties.
(i) There exists a contingent claim X˜0 ∈ B(X0) such that
PU (X0, x0) = min
X∈B(X0)
pi(X,x0) = pi(X˜0, x0). (4.10)
Furthermore, X˜0 ∈ convL(X0).
(ii) The utility price of X0 with respect to the initial portfolio x0 can be also computed as follows:
PU (X0, x0) = sup
m∈D⊥(x0)
P (X0,m) (4.11)
where
P (X0,m) = min
X∈B(X0)
mc(X) (4.12)
= mc(X˜m0 ) (4.13)
for some random vector X˜m0 ∈ L(X0) such that X˜m0 and dm
c
dP are cyclically anticomonotonic.
Before proving this theorem in the next section, let us comment the results obtained above and give some
explanations. A first consequence of the theorem above is the existence of a contingent claim X˜0 giving at
least the same expected utility as the contingent claim X0 for all utility functions U ∈ U . However, since
it belongs to the convex hull of all random variables having the same law as X0, that contingent claim is
not necessarily distributed as X0, as in the case of complete and frictionless markets (see Dybvig [9]). This
implies in particular that for some utility function U ∈ U , expected utility of X˜0 may be strictly bigger than
the expected utility of X0. This phenomenon has already been observed in Jouini and Kallal [17] in a less
general frictional setting.
4.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
We will prove Theorem 4.1 using the following preliminary lemmas.
Lemma 4.1 Let X0 ∈ Ax0T with x0 ∈ I and let m = mc +ms ∈ D⊥(x0) with Y := dm
c
dP ∈ intRd+ a.s.. Then
there exists X˜0 ∼ X0 such that X˜0 and Y are cyclically anticomonotonic and
sup
U∈U
inf
X∈BU (X0)
E [Y X] = min
X∈B(X0)
E [Y X] = E
[
Y X˜0
]
. (4.14)
Proof. First note that we obviously have B(X0) ⊂ BU (X0) for all U ∈ U , so that
sup
U∈U
inf
X∈BU (X0)
E [XY ] ≤ inf
X∈B(X0)
E [XY ] .
We are now going to prove the converse inequality and that the infimum in the RHS above is attained. By
Proposition 3.2, we can choose X˜0 ∼ X0 such that X˜0 and Y are cyclically anticomonotonic and X˜0 satisfies
E[X˜0Y ] = min{E [Y X] : X ∈ L(X0)} =: λ0,
so that the infimum in (4.14) is attained. Notice that λ0 ≤ 1 since m ∈ D⊥(x0) and X0 ∈ Ax0T , so that
mc(X0) = E[Y X0] ≤ 1. At this point, we would be tempted to follow the second part of the proof of Theorem
3.2 to construct a utility function U ∈ U such that X˜0 solves
sup{E [U(X)] : X ∈ Ax0T ,E [XY ] ≤ λ0}.
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However, it may happen that X˜0 and Y do not satisfy the condition (iv) of Theorem 3.2, i.e.
ess sup ‖Y ‖ =∞⇒ ess inf ‖X˜0‖ = 0, ess inf ‖Y ‖ = 0⇒ ess sup ‖X˜0‖ =∞. (4.15)
Nevertheless, for any ε > 0 and for all i = 1, . . . , d, we can exhibit a random vector X˜ε satisfying the following
properties
(i) X˜ε and Y are cyclically anticomonotonic and satisfy the properties (4.15) above;
(ii) E[Y X˜0]− ε0 ≤ E[Y X˜ε] ≤ E[Y X˜0], for some 0 < ε0 ≤ ε.
In order to obtain such random variables, one may proceed as follows: for any ε > 0 and any y ∈ Rd+,
define
X˜iε,y := e
−εY iX˜i01{‖Y ‖<y} +
(
X˜0 +
ε
Y i
)
1{‖Y ‖≥y}, i = 1, . . . , d.
Consider now the function y 7→ ψ(y) := E[Y (X˜ε,y − X˜0)] and notice that ψ(y)→ ε > 0 as y ↓ 0, while ψ(y)
tends to a strictly negative value as y → +∞. Thus, one can choose y = y(ε0) such that property (ii) above
is satisfied. It is then easy to check that, by construction, properties (i) above is fulfilled as well. Let us
denote X˜ε := X˜ε,y(ε0).
Thus, even though X˜ε might not be attainable, we can nonetheless reproduce step-by-step the second
part of the proof of Theorem 3.2, and find a utility function Uε ∈ U such that X˜ε solves
sup
{
E [Uε(X)] : X ∈ Ax0T ,E [XY ] ≤ E[X˜εY ]
}
.
We first deduce that
sup
U∈U
inf
X∈BU (X˜ε)
E [XY ] ≥ inf
X∈BUε (X˜ε)
E [XY ] = E[Y X˜ε].
Moreover, X˜0 is a contingent claim preferred by each agent to X˜ε, i.e. E[U(X˜0)] ≥ E[U(X˜ε)] for all U ∈ U .
Indeed, let U ∈ U . Since Y ∈ ∂U(X˜0) (recall that Y and X˜0 are cyclically anticomonotonic), we have
E
[
U(X˜ε)
]
− E
[
U(X˜0)
]
≤ E
[
〈Y, X˜ε − X˜0〉
]
≤ 0,
by the RHS in property (ii) above. Therefore BU (X˜0) ⊂ BU (X˜ε) for all U ∈ U , yielding
sup
U∈U
inf
X∈BU (X˜0)
E [XY ] ≥ sup
U∈U
inf
X∈BU (X˜ε)
E [XY ] = E
[
Y X˜ε
]
≥ E
[
Y X˜0
]
− ε0,
where the last inequality is due to the LHS in property (ii) above. Since BU (X˜0) = BU (X0), for all U ∈ U ,
we finally obtain
sup
U∈U
inf
X∈BU (X0)
E [XY ] = sup
U∈U
inf
X∈BU (X˜0)
E [XY ] ≥ min
X∈B(X0)
E [Y X]− ε0.
Letting ε (and so ε0) tend to zero ends the proof. 
Lemma 4.2 Let X0 ∈ Ax0T with x0 ∈ I. Then we have
inf
X∈B(X0)
pi(X,x0) = sup
m∈D⊥(x0)
inf
X∈B(X0)
mc(X). (4.16)
Proof. Let
D⊥n (x0) := D⊥(x0) ∩ {m ∈ ba(Rd) : ‖m‖ ≤ n}, n ≥ 1.
The set D⊥n (x0) is a nonempty, convex, σ(ba(Rd), L∞(Rd))-compact subset of ba(Rd) (by Alaoglu’s theorem).
On the other hand the set B(X0) is nonempty and convex as well. Furthermore, m 7→ mc(X) is weak*
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continuous on the set D⊥n (x0) and X 7→ mc(X) is a linear and so convex function. Thus we can apply the
minmax theorem as in, e.g., [29] (Theorem 2.10.2), yielding
sup
m∈D⊥n (x0)
inf
X∈B(X0)
mc(X) = inf
X∈B(X0)
sup
m∈D⊥n (x0)
mc(X). (4.17)
Furthermore, since D⊥n (x0) ⊂ D⊥(x0) for all n ≥ 1, it is easy to see that
lim
n→+∞ supm∈D⊥n (x0)
inf
X∈B(X0)
mc (X) ≤ sup
m∈D⊥(x0)
inf
X∈B(X0)
mc(X). (4.18)
Consider now the function pinx0 , defined by
pinx0(X) := sup
m∈D⊥n (x0)
mc (X) .
Using (4.17) and (4.18), we obtain therefore that
lim
n→+∞ infX∈B(X0)
pinx0(X) ≤ sup
m∈D⊥(x0)
inf
X∈B(X0)
mc (X) . (4.19)
Now, we study the convergence of infX∈B(X0) pi
n
x0(X) as n goes to infinity. We can find a minimizing sequence
Xn in B(X0) (and so Rd+-valued) such that
lim
n→+∞ infX∈B(X)
pinx0(X) = limn→+∞pi
n
x0(Xn).
Since Xn is a sequence in Ax0T with values in Rd+, it is also positive for the preorder induced by the random
cone KT . Thus we can apply Lemma 3.2 in Campi and Schachermayer [4] implying that the sequence Xn
is bounded in L1(Q) for some probability Q equivalent to P on FT . Thanks to Komlo`s Theorem (see,
e.g., Theorem 5.2 in [20] or [14]), we can find a sequence X̂n ∈ conv{Xn, Xn+1, ...} still in B(X0) (which
is convex) such that X̂n → X̂ a.s. under Q as well as under P, being the two measures equivalent. To
prove that X̂ belongs to B(X0) we use the upper semicontinuity of each utility functions U ∈ U getting
that U(X̂) ≥ lim supn U(X̂n). We take expectation under P and we obtain E[U(X̂)] ≥ E[lim supn U(X̂n)].
Fatou’s lemma yields E[U(X̂)] ≥ lim supn E[U(X̂n)]. Finally, the concavity of U gets E[U(X̂n)] ≥ E[U(X0)]
and so E[U(X̂)] ≥ E[U(X0)] for all U ∈ U , so that X̂ ∈ B(X0). Moreover, since Ax0T is Fatou closed (Theorem
3.5 in [4]), we also have X̂ ∈ Ax0T .
We then obtain:
pinx0(X̂n) ≤ sup
m≥n
pinx0(Xm) ≤ sup
m≥n
pimx0(Xm).
Thus, we have
inf
k≥n
sup
m∈D⊥n (x0)
mc(X̂k) ≥ sup
m∈D⊥n (x0)
inf
k≥n
mc(X̂k) ≥ sup
Y ∈D⊥n (x0)
E
[
inf
k≥n
dmc
dP
Xk
]
.
and, therefore by the theorem of monotone convergence we have§
§Let m ∈ D⊥n (x0), n ≥ 1. One has
mc( inf
k≥n
X̂k) ≤ mc(X̂n) ≤
∑
i≥n
αim
c(Xi) ≤ mc(Xn).
Taking supremum over D⊥n (x0), one has
pin(Xn) ≥ sup
m∈D⊥n (x0)
mc
(
inf
k≥n
X̂k
)
.
Take the limit and conclude.
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lim
n→+∞pi
n
x0 (Y Xn) ≥ limn→+∞m
c
(
inf
k≥n
X̂k
)
= sup
m∈D⊥(x0)
mc(X̂).
Since X̂ ∈ B(X0), by (4.19) we have that
inf
X∈B(X0)
sup
m∈D⊥(x0)
mc(X) ≤ sup
m∈D⊥(x0)
mc(X̂),
so getting
inf
X∈B(X0)
sup
m∈D⊥(x0)
mc(X) ≤ sup
m∈D⊥(x0)
inf
X∈B(X0)
mc(X).
The other inequality is straightforward and the duality result (4.16) is proved. 
Now, we can conclude the proof of Theorem 4.1 using the previous two lemmas. First, observe that using
(4.16) we have
PU (X0, x0) = sup
U∈U
inf
X∈BU (X0)
pi(X,x0) = sup
U∈U
sup
m∈D⊥(x0)
inf
X∈BU (X0)
mc(X).
Therefore
PU (X0, x0) ≥ sup
m∈D⊥,∗(x0)
sup
U∈U
inf
X∈BU (X0)
mc(X),
where D⊥+(x0) = {m ∈ D⊥(x0) : dm
c
dP ∈ intRd+}. From (4.14), we have
sup
U∈U
inf
X∈BU (X0)
mc(X) = min
X∈B(X0)
mc(X)
for m ∈ D⊥(x0) and therefore
PU (X0, x0) ≥ sup
m∈D⊥+ (x0)
min
X∈B(X0)
mc(X).
Moreover, let m′ ∈ D⊥+(x0), m ∈ D⊥(x0), and mλ = λm + (1 − λ)m′ for λ ∈ [0, 1). We have mλ ∈ D⊥+(x0)
and for all X ∈ B(X0), limλ↑1mcλ(X) = mc(X). We deduce that:
sup
m∈D⊥(x0)
min
X∈B(X0)
mc(X) = sup
m∈D⊥+ (x0)
min
X∈B(X0)
mc(X).
Now, we can use equality (4.16) to obtain
PU (X0, x0) ≥ inf
X∈B(X0)
sup
m∈D⊥(x0)
mc(X).
The reverse inequality is straightforward and we conclude that
PU (X0, x0) = inf
X∈B(X0)
sup
m∈D⊥(x0)
mc (X)
= inf
X∈B(X0)
pi(X,x0)
= min {pi(X,x0) : X ∈ convL(X0)} ,
i.e. we just proved property (i) in this theorem (recall that the closure above refers to a.s. convergence).
Finally, we can deduce from (4.1) that
PU (X0, x0) = sup
m∈D⊥(x0)
min
X∈B(X0)
mc(X)
which gives property (ii) after applying (4.16) once more. The proof of the theorem is now complete.
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A Appendix
This appendix collects the proofs of some technical results that have been used throughout the paper.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. It is straightforward that cyclic anticomonotonicity implies (3.3). Con-
versely, assume that X and Y satisfy property (3.3). To obtain that X and Y are cyclically anticomonotonic,
it suffices to prove that there exist two random vectors X ′, Y ′ with X ′ = X and Y ′ = Y a.s., such that X ′
and Y ′ are cyclically anticomonotonic. Denote X = (X1, . . . , Xd) and Y = (Y 1, . . . , Y d), and consider the
product set for n ∈ N∗:
Ndn2n := {1, . . . , n2n} × . . .× {1, . . . , n2n} .
Then, for each vector of integers I = (I1, . . . , Id) and K = (K1, . . . ,Kd) in Ndn2n , define the sets AI and BK
by
AI :=
⋂
1≤i≤d
{
Ii
2n
≤ Xi < I
i + 1
2n
}
, BK :=
⋂
1≤j≤d
{
Ij
2n
≤ Y j < I
j + 1
2n
}
.
in such a way that the family {AI∩BK : (I,K) ∈ (Ndn2n)2} is a partition of the set {(X,Y ) ∈ [0, n]d×[0, n]d}.
The rest of the proof is structured in three main steps.
Step 1: construction of X ′. We define
Xin :=
∑
(I,K)∈Pn
Ii
2n
1AI
⋂
BK
with Pn :=
{
(I,K) ∈ (Ndn2n)2 : P (AI ∩BK) > 0}. Defining
Nn :=
 ⋃
(I,K)∈Pn
(AI ∩BK)
C
one can see that when ω /∈ Nn, we have ‖Xn(ω) −X(ω)‖ ≤ 2−n for every n ∈ N. Thus, for every ω ∈ Ω,
Xn converges and we can define its limit by setting
X ′(ω) := lim
n→+∞Xn(ω).
By construction, X ′ = X a.s., since P(Nn) → 0. Indeed, one has P(Nn) = P(X ≥ n1, Y ≥ n1) which goes
to 0 as n→ +∞, being both X,Y finite valued.
Step 2: construction of Y ′. In the same way, we define
Y jn =
∑
(I,K)∈Pn
Kj
2n
1AI
⋂
BK .
If ω /∈ Nn, we have ‖Y n(ω) − Y (ω)‖ ≤ 2−n for every n ∈ N. Therefore, for every ω, Y n converges and we
can define its limit setting
Y ′(ω) := lim
n→+∞Yn(ω)
yielding that Y ′ = Y almost surely.
Step 3: conclusion. The two sequences Yn and Xn have been constructed in order to have cyclically
anticomonotonic random vectors in the limit. Indeed, let Ωn = Ω \ Nn and p ∈ N∗. For (ω1, ω2) ∈ Ω2n, we
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have
〈Y n(ω1), Xn(ω1)−Xn(ω2)〉 − 〈Y (ω1), X(ω1)−X(ω2)〉 = 〈Y n(ω1)− Y (ω1), Xn(ω1)−Xn(ω2)〉
+〈Y (ω1), Xn(ω1)−X(ω1)〉
−〈Y (ω1), Xn(ω2)−X(ω2)〉
≤ n
2n
+
n
2n
+
n
2n
.
Thus, for every (ω1, . . . , ωp+1) ∈ Ωp+1n with ωp+1 = ω1, we have
p∑
i=1
〈Y n(ωi), Xn(ωi)−Xn(ωi+1)〉 −
p∑
i=1
〈Y (ωi), X(ωi)−X(ωi+1)〉 ≤ 3p n
2n
. (A.1)
Consider now the function
gn(ω1, . . . , ωp) := 〈Yn(ω1), Xn(ω1)−Xn(ω2)〉+ · · ·+ 〈Yn(ωp), Xn(ωp)−Xn(ω1)〉 .
It is constant on the set ×pi=1AIi ∩BKi , for (Ii,Ki) ∈ Pn, i = 1, . . . , p. Thus, we necessarily have
gn(ω1, . . . , ωp) ≤ 3p n
2n
.
Indeed, if it was not the case, equation (A.1) would yield that for some (Ii,Ki) ∈ Pn, i = 1, . . . , p, and for all
(ω1, . . . , ωp) ∈ ×pi=1AIi ∩BKi – a strictly positive probability set, by construction – the following inequality
holds:
〈Y (ω1), X(ω1)−X(ω2)〉+ · · ·+ 〈Y (ωp), X(ωp)−X(ω1)〉 > 0
which contradicts equation (3.3). We conclude that for every (ω1, . . . , ωp) ∈ Ap, where A := Ω \ ∩n≥0Nn,
we have
〈Y ′(ω1), X ′(ω1)−X ′(ω2)〉+ · · ·+ 〈Y ′(ωp), X ′(ωp)−X ′(ω1)〉 ≤ 0
with P(A) = 1− limn P(Nn) = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 3.2. First, distinguish between two cases: If for all X ∈ L(X0) (implying in
particular that X ∈ L0(Rd+)) we have E [XY ] = +∞, there is nothing to prove. Let us turn to the second
case when there exists at least one X ∈ L(X0) such that E [XY ] <∞, so that the infimum in (3.5) is finite.
In the following, we denote CX0 a copula of X0, and CY a copula of Y (we refer to Nelson’s book [23] for
details on copulas). Consider now the set C(X0, Y ) of all copulas on R2d, such that for every C ∈ C(X0, Y ),
the marginal copula of the d first variables is CX0 , and the marginal copula of the d last variables is CY , i.e.
C(u1, u2, . . . , ud, 1, . . . , 1) = CX(u1, u2, . . . , ud),
C(1, . . . , 1, v1, v2, . . . , vd) = CY (u1, u2, . . . , ud).
It is straightforward to see that the set C(X0, Y ) is closed with respect to the topology of pointwise con-
vergence on C, the set of all possible copulas on R2d. Furthermore the set C is compact with respect to
this topology (see Deheuvels [7], Theorem 2.3). Thus the set C(X0, Y ) is itself compact with respect to the
topology of pointwise convergence. Let Xn be a sequence in L(X0) such that
lim
n→+∞E (Y Xn) = inf{E(Y X) | X ∈ (X0)},
and let Cn denote the copula of (Xn, Y ). Since C(X0, Y ) is compact, we can assume w.l.o.g. (up to extracting
subsequences) that the sequence Cn ∈ C(X0, Y ) converges pointwise to a copula C ∈ C(X0, Y ). Consider
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the random vector X˜0 such that the copula of (X˜0, Y ) is C. In particular, X˜0 ∈ L(X0). Notice that
E [〈Y,Xn〉] =
d∑
i=1
E
[
XinY
i
]
=
d∑
i=1
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
P(Xin > t, Y i > u)dtdu
=
d∑
i=1
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
1− P (Xi0 ≤ t)− P (Y i ≤ u)− Cin (P (Xi0 ≤ t) ,P (Y i ≤ u)) dtdu.
where Cin denotes the marginal copula of the vector (X
i
n, Y
i) and where we used the fact that Xin has the
same law as Xi0 for all i. By the pointwise convergence of Cn to the copula C of (X˜0, Y ), we deduce that,
for every u ≥ 0, t ≥ 0 and i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, we have
lim
n→+∞C
i
n
(
P
(
Xi0 ≤ t
)
,P
(
Y i ≤ u)) = Ci (P (Xi0 ≤ t) ,P (Y i ≤ u))
with Ci is the marginal copula of the vector (X˜i0, Y
i). Therefore by Fatou’s lemma and the equation (A.2),
we have
E
[
〈X˜0, Y 〉
]
=
d∑
i=1
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
1− P (Xi0 ≤ t)− P (Y i ≤ u)− Ci (P (Xi0 ≤ t) ,P (Y i ≤ u)) dtdu
≤ lim inf
n→+∞ E [〈Xn, Y 〉] ≤ min{E [XY ] : X ∈ L(X0)}
and thus, E[Y X˜0] = min{E [Y X] | X ∈ L(X0)}.
Now, let us prove that X˜0 and Y are cyclically anticomonotonic. Suppose that this is not the case. Thus,
by Corollary (3.1) there exist ε > 0, p ≥ 1 and some non negligible measurable sets Ω1, . . . ,Ωp such that for
all (ω1, . . . , ωp) ∈ Ω1 × · · · × Ωp, we have
〈X˜0(ω1)− X˜0(ω2), Y (ω1)〉+ · · ·+ 〈X˜0(ωp)− X˜0(ω1), Y (ωp)〉 ≥ ε
and, being the space (Ω,F ,P) atomless, we can choose the sets Ω1, . . . ,Ωp in such a way that P(Ω1) =
P(Ω2) = · · · = P(Ωp). Consider a random vector X ′, distributed as X˜0 with{
X ′|Ω\∪pi=1Ωi = (X˜0)|Ω\∪
p
i=1Ωi
X ′|Ωi ∼ (X˜0)|Ωi+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ p
with the convention Ωp+1 = Ω1.
¶A consequence of such a construction is that X ′(Ωi) = X˜0(Ωi+1) a.s. for
all i = 1, . . . , p. Since X ′ and X˜0 coincide on Ω \ ∪pi=1Ωi we have
E [〈X ′, Y 〉]− E
[
〈X˜0, Y 〉
]
=
p∑
i=1
E
[
〈Y, (X ′ − X˜0)|Ωi〉
]
.
Moreover, we have by construction that
∑p
i=1〈Y, (X ′ − X˜0)|Ωi〉 ≤ −ε, which implies
E [〈X ′, Y 〉]− E
[
〈X˜0, Y 〉
]
≤ −pε.
As a consequence, we have E [X ′Y ] < E[X˜0Y ], so that X˜0 cannot be the minimizer. This is clearly a
contradiction and ends the proof. 
¶A construction of such a random vector X′ goes as follows: take a random variable U with uniform distribution on (0, 1)
and set X′ = X˜0 on Ω0 and, for i = 1, . . . , n, X′|Ωi = F
−1
i+1(Ui) where Ui is the restriction of U on Ωi and Fi+1 is the c.d.f. of
the restriction of X˜0 on Ωi+1. It is easy to verify that X
′ satisfies the properties listed above. Notice that to perform such a
construction we need the assumption that X0 has a continuous c.d.f..
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